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Game Theory and Environmental and Resource 
Economics  
– In Honour of Alfred Endres 
 
Michael Finus (Department of Economics, University of Bath, UK) and Bianca Rundshagen 
(Institute of Economic Theory, University of Hagen, Germany) 
This special issue is devoted to Alfred Endres, on the occasion of his 65th birthday in 2015, as 
a tribute to his fundamental contributions to the field environmental and resource economics. 
Endres earned his diploma (equivalent to Master) in Economics from the University of Bonn in 
1973 and his PhD from the University of Dortmund in 1976. In 1981 he earned his habilitation 
from the University of Constance. In 1982, Endres was appointed to the new and first chair in 
Environmental Economics in Germany at the Technical University of Berlin. Currently, Alfred 
Endres is Full Professor of Economics at the University of Hagen and Permanent Visiting 
Professor of Environmental Economics at the University of Witten/Herdecke. He held visiting 
appointments at the University of California, San Diego and La Trobe University, Melbourne 
and has also taught at the Bosphorus University, Istanbul, Zhejiang University at Hangzhou and 
the State University of New York at Buffalo. He is the author of numerous journal articles and 
14 books on Environmental Economics, Applied Economics and Microeconomics, among 
those his intermediate textbook “Environmental Economics – Theory and Policy” published by 
Cambridge University Press (Endres 2011). 
At a time when environmental regulation was essentially based on command and control 
instruments, Endres wrote his dissertation on the internalization of environmental externalities 
using negotiations and taxes (Endres, 1976). He soon became well-known for his contributions 
on the Coase-Theorem and market-based environmental policy instruments, including permit 
trading (Endres 1977a,b, 1983, 1986 and Braulke and Endres 1985). Ironically, one of his most 
innovative early papers (Endres 1985) was published in a hardly accessible volume of collected 
articles, which may explain that it was overlooked by the subsequent literature. Endres 
presented a pioneering analysis on the economics of interacting pollutants. Many years later, 
Kuosmanen and Laukkanen (2011) “rediscovered” the article and highlighted its seminal 
character. 
One major research strand in Alfred Endres’ work relates to the economic analysis of law. He 
published papers on product liability, tort law and incomplete information (Endres 1989, 1991a, 
1992, Endres and Querner 1995 and Endres and Lüdeke 1998, 1999). This general analysis was 
extended to environmental economics where Endres paid special attention to the analysis of 
environmental liability law (Endres 1991b, Endres and Friehe 2012, 2015). His contributions 
to this area closed an important and surprising gap in the literature. On the one hand, 
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environmental law plays a fundamental role in actual environmental policy making. On the 
other hand, it is usually neglected in the environmental economics literature, which is also 
evident from numerous textbooks on the subject.  
A second major research strand and very much related to the theme of this special issue 
combines game theoretic and microeconomic approaches to analyse transboundary pollution. 
Endres was one of the pioneers in analysing the conditions for the implementation of efficient 
international environmental agreements. He introduced the concept of non-cooperative 
international bargaining according to the smallest common denominator rule (Endres 1997). 
Endres was convinced that the typical bargaining solutions available in game theory are ill-
suited to capture typical characteristics of actual international negotiations. In order to improve 
our understanding of actual treaty-making, and to contribute to a positive analysis of actual 
negotiations, he modelled negotiations as a Walrasian auction process in which governments 
make selfish and strategic proposals. He found two features important. First, international 
agreements are typically reached by unanimous consensus, reflecting the agreement on the 
smallest common denominator. Second, policy instruments and bargaining solutions are not 
always efficient. Apart from a bargaining over a uniform emission tax, he considered uniform 
emission reduction quotas. He showed that those second-best solutions may achieve more than 
first-best solution if agreements are subject to free-riding. The reason is twofold. First, the 
agreed abatement target is lower than first-best solution, allowing more countries to join an 
environmental treaty. Second, uniform emission reduction quotas, though generally not cost-
effective, lead to a more symmetric distribution of the gains from cooperation, again, allowing 
more countries to join an environmental treaty. In the research project “Cooperative Solutions 
for International Environmental Problems: An Economic Analysis Considering Public Choice 
Aspects” he continued this line of research with Michael Finus (Endres and Finus 1998, 1999, 
2002) with follow-up publications (Finus 2001, Finus and Rundshagen 1998a,b) along the same 
lines. For instance, it was shown that similar results can be obtained for negotiations on the 
initial allocation of permits. Moreover, it was demonstrated that this bargaining process is 
robust against strategic proposals and that stability of large effective coalitions are not only 
obtained for coalition models but also in repeated games with renegotiation-proof 
implementation strategies.  
In the research project “Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change: Integrating Risk 
and Strategic Aspects in the Economic Analysis of Global Environmental Problems” he applied 
a risk-strategic approach to international cooperation. This combined game-theoretic and risk 
economic methods to explain the possibility of international co-operation in terms of objective 
and subjective risk assessment. Given the intensity of (country-specific) risk aversion he 
showed that the prospects of co-operation varies by the choice of national policy instruments 
and technology. Both factors determine the objective risk parameters. To highlight their 
influence on the success of global risk management, he developed a new criterion for 
international policy assessment and choice: "the criterion of co-operative push" (Endres and 
Ohl 2002, 2003). The inclusion of uncertainty and risk in agreement formation inspired a couple 
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of papers much later on, like Boucher and Bramoullé (2010), Bramoullé and Treich (2009), and 
Hong and Karp (2013).  
A third and more recent line of research of Alfred Endres is the analysis of induced technical 
change through environmental policy instruments. Issues like the invention and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies are considered with a particular focus on environmental 
liability law. In particular, Alfred Endres analyses how different liability rules, like strict 
liability and negligence rule, perform with respect to their dynamic incentives, considering 
different sources of market failures (Endres and Bertram 2006, Endres et al. 2007 and Endres 
and Friehe 2011). Endres and his co-authors were the first who analysed the incentives of 
environmental liability law for investments into environmentally friendly technological change 
and the diffusion of green technology. This work opened up the intellectual space for a 
completely new area of research. In the recent literature, this approach was followed by 
contributions like Jacob (2015) and Korsmo (2015), generalizing and extending the initial 
contributions by Endres. Even though in Endres’ work on dynamic incentives there is an 
emphasis on environmental liability law, other environmental policy instruments, like effluent 
charges and transferable discharge permits, are also considered (Endres and Rundshagen 2010). 
The analysis spans from national policy issues to international environmental treaty making 
(Endres and Rundshagen 2013), which nicely demonstrates how all three research strands are 
linked, despite each of these strands is important in its own right. 
Another paper of Endres worth mentioning, even though it does not deal with the economics of 
the environment, is Endres (1980). This paper deals with the economics of excludable public 
goods. It is the first paper which analyses the markets for information in which the buyers are 
able to costlessly diffuse information and process information in their production function. 
During the time before the internet, this may have been regarded as an ivory tower exercise. 
Decades later, the fundamental implications of this model for the economics of information 
and, very practically, for the problems of the publishing industry are very evident and relevant. 
This special issue comprises some interesting papers which use game theory to analyse 
environmental and resource economic problems. Due to the huge number of submissions, the 
issue is split in two parts of which Volume I is published in 2015 and Volume II in 2016. This 
is Volume I. In the following, we give a short overview of the different contributions. Before 
doing so, it is worthwhile to briefly recall that the last three decades have seen an increasing 
use of game-theoretic tools in order to analyse market failures due to environmental 
externalities and the possibility to correct those through environmental policy instruments. This 
is not surprising: game theory analyses the strategic interaction among different agents and tries 
to predict the outcome of those interactions. Hence, game theory is particularly suited for 
analysing the incentive structure of agents to which they are exposed in incomplete markets, 
state regulation and weak international institutions in the context of environmental externalities. 
The first set of papers deals with the analysis of international environmental agreements (IEAs) 
or international fishery agreements (IFAs). Due to the lack of a global enforcement authority, 
IEAs and IFAs have to be self-enforcing. Due to strong free-rider incentives, the design of 
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stable and effective agreements is a challenging task. This has been the case when the first 
papers emerged in the early 1990’s but continues to be a problem, which explains why still 
many papers are written on the subject. Broadly speaking, models can be classified into non-
cooperative and cooperative game-theoretic approaches. The non-cooperative approach has 
proved to be particularly fruitful for a positive analysis of the formation and stability of IEAs 
and IFAs, even though many papers combine elements of both approaches. For instance, the 
analysis of the formation of equilibrium coalition structures typically assumes that coalition 
members maximize the aggregate welfare of all coalition members and assume that agreements 
are binding, which clearly has a cooperative spirit, but the decisions whether to join an 
agreement or remain outside are taken non-cooperatively.  
In the first paper, Hovi et al. (2015) review the formal literature on models of international 
climate cooperation, mainly based on papers rooted in the economics tradition but also include 
some insights from political scientists, which broaden the perspective. In the first part of their 
paper they point out the rather pessimistic conclusions reached by the bulk of literature on 
coalitions, repeated games and some other approaches. They then ask the provocative question 
whether there is light at the end of the tunnel. Based on the theoretic literature in economics 
and political sciences, but also supported by real world evidence, they argue that even though 
mitigating free-rider incentives completely is difficult, they can be reduced substantially 
through various measures. Examples include for instance issue linkage of climate cooperation 
and R&D cooperation, trade restrictions and sanctions, a deposit refund system in order to 
enhance the credibility of sanctions, trust and network approaches to increase linkages and 
reciprocity, decentralized forms of cooperation as well as transfers or minimum participation 
clauses. The article greatly benefits from the background of the authors who have all worked 
for a very long time on the subject and have roots in the economics as well as the formal political 
sciences literature. 
The second paper by Pintassilgo et al. (2015) constitutes a survey, which reviews the expanding 
game-theoretic literature on international fishery agreements (IFAs). This strand of literature 
differs from the literature on IEAs, which mainly analyses agreements on greenhouse gases and 
other atmospheric global pollutants, by the following main characteristics. Fish stocks are a 
typical example of a renewable resource. Moreover, preservation of fish stocks constitutes an 
impure (and not a pure) public good as migration patterns matter for the exploitation of fish 
stocks as well as the establishment of property rights, at least in some regions, like exclusive 
economic zones. The distribution and migration of fish stocks determines the bargaining power 
of negotiating parties and can create a substantial asymmetry between players. This is also due 
to the fact that some fishing nations are without a coast and hence do not possess an exclusive 
economic fishing zone and hence need to act as distant water fishing nations. Pintassilgo et al. 
focus on non-cooperative game-theoretic coalition approaches but also consider some other 
approaches which have been relevant in this literature. 
Weikard et al. (2015) analyse the effect of minimum participation rules (MPRs) on the 
effectiveness of IEAs. They generalize the model of Carraro et al. (2009) to heterogeneous 
countries and assume that the MPR is specified in terms of non-cooperative abatement levels. 
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That is, the MPR is satisfied if the sum of the non-cooperative benchmark abatement levels of 
signatories exceeds an endogenously determined lower bound. (An alternative MPR could for 
instance specify a minimum number of signatories.) As in Carraro et al. (2009) the MPR is 
chosen according to a unanimity voting rule. Some arbitrary country proposes an MPR, which 
is implemented if and only if all countries agree to it. It is shown that MPRs strengthen 
cooperation, with stricter MPRs (in terms of benchmark abatement levels) outperforming 
weaker ones. If the MPR requires full participation, the grand coalition is stable. However, in 
case of heterogeneous countries, the equilibrium MPR may be lower such that partial free-
riding cannot be prevented.  
McEvoy et al. (2015) experimentally test an agreement formation game that also includes an 
endogenously determined MPR. For their purpose, they consider a simplified version of 
Carraro’s (2009) homogenous agent model. They consider a two-stage game where in the first 
stage participants vote on a MPR and in the second stage they decide whether they join the 
coalition. McEvoy et al. do not consider a typical positive externality game, which fulfils 
superadditivity. Instead, they allow for the possibility that an efficient public good provision 
level can be provided by a subcoalition. In other words, contributions to the public good yield 
a positive return only if the aggregate contributions do not exceed an upper bound. A possible 
application mentioned in the paper is that abatement activities only yield a positive marginal 
benefit as long as global emissions do not drop below the absorptive capacity of the natural 
environment. In the theoretical analysis, the equilibrium coalition size always equals the 
efficient one, irrespective whether this is the grand coalition or a sub-coalition. However, in the 
laboratory experiment it turns out that the prospects for efficient cooperation are higher when 
efficiency requires full cooperation, than in the case when efficiency requires only partial 
cooperation. This suggests that full cooperation may be viewed as a kind of focal point. 
Bayramoglu and Jacques (2015) consider a transboundary pollution problem between two 
asymmetric countries and compare the outcomes of two bargaining regimes with respect to 
global and country-specific welfare. They compare a uniform abatement agreement with costly 
monetary transfers with a differentiated agreement without transfers. Bayramoglu and Jacques 
assume “a cooperative spirit in the agreement” and therefore compare the generalized Nash 
bargaining solution in these two regimes. They show that if transaction costs are sufficiently 
low, both countries prefer the uniform agreement over the differentiated one. 
In contrast to the previously mentioned papers, Heuson et al. (2015) consider a strictly non-
cooperative climate change game with non-cooperative choice of mitigation levels. They 
analyse the interplay of two strategic variables to influence mitigation efforts abroad. These 
two variables are investment in technical progress that reduces national mitigation cost and 
adaptation efforts which reduce national environmental damages for any given level of 
mitigation. Taking into account that investment takes place before mitigation, there are three 
possible sequences of investment, mitigation and adoption, which are all systematically 
analysed. It is shown that the sequence where adaption occurs before mitigation may reinforce 
the strategic effect of underinvestment in technology. Several measures are proposed in order 
to address the negative impact of strategic behaviour by governments.  
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Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger (2015) analyse the question whether technology transfers 
from the North to the South may help to combat climate change even in the absence of a global 
climate treaty. They consider technology transfers of more energy-efficient technologies and 
assume that carbon energy is traded on a single integrated world market. It is shown that even 
under optimistic assumptions rebound and leakage effects contradict welfare improving 
solutions of the climate problem. 
Lessmann et al. (2015) compare various numerically calibrated integrated assessment models 
of climate change mitigation which have been used for the game-theoretic analysis of 
agreement formation. The basic idea is to understand in which respects these models differ but 
also what they have in common. In particular, the authors attempt to highlight the differences 
in the underlying assumptions with respect to costs and benefits and to explain how this leads 
to different results. They show that the estimates for abatement potentials of world key regions 
are rather homogenous whereas there are substantial differences in the climate change damage 
estimates. The latter reflects the fact that there are still large uncertainties with respect to the 
benefits of climate change mitigation, respectively the damages from greenhouse gas 
concentration. Those differences in damage estimates imply different predictions about 
equilibrium coalitions, even though in general, results with respect to the incentive to sign an 
agreement are rather robust. Moreover, they show that transfer schemes have a huge potential 
to improve the effectiveness of IEAs. 
Ochea and de Zeeuw (2015) use an evolutionary game theory approach to analyse the 
performance of tit-for-tat strategies in the evolution of cooperation in international 
environmental negotiations. Whereas in evolutionary game theory evolution is formalized as a 
Darwinian process of natural selection, i.e. the successful individuals have a higher fertility and 
bequeath their strategies to their descendants, Ochea and de Zeeuw consider countries that do 
not die but adjust their strategies when other strategies are more successful. In particular, they 
use replicator dynamics where the fractions of tit-for-tat strategies (compared to unconditional 
defection) increase if the performance of this strategy is better than average. They show that 
under certain circumstances full cooperative behaviour may be sustained. For this a particular 
critical mass of initial reciprocators is necessary. Ochea and de Zeeuw conclude that in the 
context of climate change, it may help if countries switch to a strategy of conditional 
cooperation instead of trying to reach a unanimous agreement.  
Houba et al (2015) analyse coalition formation and the strategic timing of joining an IEA. They 
apply the Coalitional Bargaining Game of Gomes (2005) to a river sharing problem with three 
agents and determine the Markov perfect equilibria. They show that the number of bargaining 
rounds depends on the parameter values and a grand coalition may emerge, even though a sub-
coalition is the outcome of the first bargaining round.  
The last four papers discuss various aspects of environmental policy instruments. The paper of 
Álvarez and Andre (2015) is about permit trading. They compare the effectiveness of the 
allocation rules auctioning and grandfathering, when firms have private information on their 
abatement technologies and there is a secondary market with market power where agents either 
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act as a leader or follower. It turns out that under auctioning the leader may bid strategically in 
order to increase his market power in the secondary market. On the other hand, the allocation 
under auctioning incorporates information that is only privately observable. Hence, it depends 
on the relative strength of these two effects whether auctioning or grandfathering is more cost-
effective. A departure from cost-effectiveness arises due to strategic behaviour in the permit 
market. That is, under auctioning the equilibrium is never cost-effective because the leader bids 
strategically, taking into account his position in the secondary market.  
Dubois and Eyckmans (2015) analyse Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) as a policy 
instrument of waste management. EPRs make producers financially responsible for the 
recycling of their products at the end of their life cycle. Formalizing a two-country model with 
imperfect competition in the recycling-market, they show that EPR alone cannot achieve first-
best outcomes since there are two market failures (inefficient waste recycling and 
overconsumption of waste generating products) but only one policy instrument. However, when 
countries coordinate policy instruments, EPR recycling targets can be combined with either 
excise duties or taxes on recycling residuals to achieve the social optimum. In the non-
cooperative scenario, strategic behaviour may lead to a 'race to the bottom' for taxes on 
recycling residuals or to a 'race to the top' for excise duties and EPR recycling targets. 
Eichner and Pethig (2015) question whether there are convincing welfare economic arguments 
in favour of a subsidy on green energy that complements a carbon emission trading scheme. 
Hence, they explain the coexistence of both policy instruments as the outcome of a lobbying 
game, taking emission trading as given. They consider three lobbying groups: a brown lobby, 
a green lobby and a consumer lobby. If the brown lobby is stronger than the green lobby, they 
show that green consumer preferences are a necessary condition for a green subsidy as an 
equilibrium outcome.  
Environmental tax systems often have to rely on self-reported emissions by firms, which are 
verified through costly auditing mechanisms. Oestreich (2015) compares three audit 
mechanisms with respect to the generated emission levels and the underlying incentives for 
truthful reporting: a random audit mechanism (RAM) (which is mostly assumed in the 
literature) and two competitive audit mechanisms (CAM) (imperfectly or perfectly 
discriminating audit mechanisms, respectively). In particular, it is shown that the imperfectly 
discriminatory CAM may induce fewer emissions than RAM. However, the CAM with perfect 
discrimination may induce higher emissions than RAM. 
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